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Coming
May 2027 Default flip Relay

NTLM signing phase 2: servers require signing by default

The second half of the change that shipped in November 2026 (below, under Enforcing now). In May 2027 the default for ServerRequireNtlmSign moves from 0 to 1 on patched Windows servers. A client that does not offer NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN is rejected with SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION (0x80090302) and the server logs a Warning 4023. Anonymous and guest connections stay exempt. Kerberos is not involved.

Same condition as every other flip on this page: an explicitly set value is respected. Setting it to 1 yourself, now, is how you take phase 2 early on a server you have already audited; leaving it at 0 after May 2027 is how you opt out, and Microsoft has said the registry values may be removed later. The clients that will fail are the ones logging flags 0xA0888205 in 4023 today, which is the signal to act on between now and then. The relay consequence is the point: a relayed NTLM session has no session key, so once the server requires signing, relay to that server stops working at the NTLM layer rather than depending on SMB or LDAP signing per protocol.

Microsoft: NTLM signing improvements (KB5135557) →
Slipped from H2 2026, then "next major release" Deprecation

NTLM deprecation, phases 2 and 3

Microsoft's roadmap runs in three phases. Phase 1, enhanced NTLM auditing, is available now in Server 2025 and Windows 11 24H2 and is the part you should actually be using. Phase 2 brings IAKerb and a local KDC to broad availability. The target was H2 2026, after a public preview for Insiders in June 2026, and it has slipped: Microsoft's Retiring NTLM FAQ, revised on 19 October 2026, still has both features Insider-only and "generally available in the coming months." Between them they remove the two most common reasons NTLM survives: Kerberos needing line of sight to a domain controller, and local account authentication. The same FAQ previews a consolidated NTLM blocking policy engine (allow, audit, block SSO only, block all) with no names or dates yet.

Phase 3 disables NTLM by default in the next Windows Server and client release, requiring explicit re-enablement through policy. Be honest about the horizon, though: "next major release" plus enterprise adoption is a multi-year story, and NTLM is not being deleted from the OS, only switched off by default. In-market Server 2019 through 2025 and Windows 10 and 11 keep NTLM. The auditing will be useful to you long before the deprecation is.

Microsoft: Retiring NTLM FAQ →
Enforcing now
10 November 2026 Phase 1 Relay

NTLM signing phase 1: clients offer signing on every connection

Shipped in the November 2026 updates as KB5135557, tracked as CVE-2026-118737. Before this, an application that did not ask SSPI for integrity, sequence detection or relay detection got an NTLM context carrying NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN, a 16-byte zero placeholder with no session key behind it. Now Windows clients offer real signing plus key exchange on every non-anonymous NTLM connection, so an authenticated session always establishes a session key. To be clear about what is and is not enforced: clients changed behavior; servers still accept unsigned clients and only log them. Enforcement on the server side is the May 2027 entry above.

Both values live under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0. ClientAllowUnsignedNtlm defaults to 0 (offer signing); 1 is the temporary opt-out. ServerRequireNtlmSign defaults to 0 (accept both); 1 enforces early, no restart. With NTLM enhanced auditing on, Event 4023 (server) and 4022 (client) in Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational show the negotiated flags: 0xE0888215 has SIGN and KEY_EXCH and is phase-2 ready, 0xA0888205 has neither and will be rejected in May 2027. Available on Server 2019 and later. In scope: Windows 11 23H2 through 26H2, Windows 10 Enterprise LTSC 2021, Server 2016 through 2025. Older servers that do not echo SIGN get the legacy behavior with no failure.

Microsoft: NTLM signing improvements (KB5135557) →    News coverage →
13 October 2026 Default flipped

BlockNTLMv1SSO has flipped from Audit to Enforce

This one is done. NTLMv1 was removed as a protocol in Server 2025 and Windows 11 24H2, and nowhere else, so anything older still has it. Even on those newest builds, remnants of NTLMv1 cryptography survived in single sign-on paths, most visibly MS-CHAPv2 on domain-joined machines. With the 13 October 2026 security updates (KB5127648 for Windows 11 24H2, 25H2 and 26H2, plus the matching Server 2025 update), Enforce became the internal default for BlockNTLMv1SSO on any machine where the value was never set.

Three clarifications, because each has caused a support ticket. The update does not create or modify the registry value, so an absent value now means Enforce and there is nothing to find in the registry. If you had set the value explicitly, your setting is respected and nothing moved. Machines running Credential Guard were already blocking this and saw no change. Audit mode logs Event 4024 when NTLMv1-derived credentials are used; Enforce blocks them and logs 4025. Manual credential entry keeps working. What broke in the field was 802.1X PEAP Wi-Fi and VPN sign-on riding MS-CHAPv2. Setting the value to 0 restores Audit mode while you fix the dependency, and Microsoft describes that as temporary.

Microsoft: manage NTLMv1 changes (KB5066470) →    Microsoft: changes to NTLMv1 →
Jan → Apr → Jul 2026 Hardening Kerberoasting

RC4 in Kerberos: the three-phase removal, and where the bits live

DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes controls what a KDC treats as the assumed encryption types for accounts with no explicit configuration. Historically it defaulted to 0x27, meaning DES, RC4 and AES-SHA1 session keys. On Server 2025 the default is 0x24, because DES is gone. The three phases:

13 January 2026 — audit only. Nothing changes yet: the default is untouched and the updates simply log warnings for accounts that would break, as Event IDs 201–209 in the System log. Controlled by a new registry subkey, RC4DefaultDisablementPhase.
14 April 2026 — the default actually moves. For accounts with no explicit msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes, the KDC default becomes 0x18, AES-SHA1 only. Rollback is still possible via RC4DefaultDisablementPhase. Event 205 flags explicit configurations that are themselves insecure.
July 2026 — updates from July onward stop reading RC4DefaultDisablementPhase at all. 0x18 is enforced and there is no rollback.

Two bitmask notes worth having while you audit: 0x18 means AES128 and AES256 in both msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes and DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes, and 0x20 is honored only in DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes. Why this matters beyond breakage: RC4 service tickets are what make Kerberoasting cheap. Removing the fallback removes most of the offline cracking economics with it.

Microsoft: What is going on with RC4 in Kerberos → Beyond RC4 for Windows authentication →
Already enforced
11 February 2025 · 9 September 2025 Hardening No opt-out

Certificate-based authentication: strong mapping is mandatory and the escape hatch is gone

KB5014754 shipped in May 2022 and put domain controllers into Compatibility mode. Two dates matter since, and they get confused with each other constantly. On 11 February 2025 DCs moved to Full Enforcement automatically unless the registry key had already been set. On 9 September 2025 the StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement key stopped being supported at all, removing the ability to fall back to Compatibility mode.

Practical consequence for anyone reading the ESC literature, stated carefully because it is easy to overstate: a patched, current DC can no longer be put into the weak-mapping state via StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement, which closes one of the two routes into ESC9 and ESC10. The other route is still open. Both also work where Schannel's CertificateMappingMethods includes the UPN flag, and that is a separate registry value on a separate schedule which none of this touched. Check it independently. What broke along the way: certificates issued before the SID extension existed, and third-party CAs that do not populate it.

Microsoft KB5014754 →
Windows Server 2025 · Windows 11 24H2 Hardening New installs only

The Server 2025 defaults, and the upgrade trap

Server 2025 and Windows 11 24H2 ship meaningfully harder than anything before them. NTLMv1 is removed. DES is removed. Read that as narrowly as it is written: this is the newest builds only. Server 2019 and 2022, Windows 10, and Windows 11 up to 23H2 still ship NTLMv1 and still accept it unless you have hardened LmCompatibilityLevel yourself. For most estates that is still the majority of the fleet. SMB signing is required by default for all outbound connections, where previously it was required only for SYSVOL and NETLOGON and by domain controllers. An SMB authentication rate limiter is on by default, which blunts brute forcing. The SMB client can block NTLM outright for outbound connections via Disable-SmbClientNtlmAuth. New Active Directory deployments require LDAP signing by default, LDAP channel binding is set to When supported, client encryption is preferred, and channel binding auditing is on, with events 3074 and 3075 available to find the clients that would break under a stricter setting.

The trap is upgrades. These are defaults for new deployments. An environment upgraded in place keeps whatever it had, which for most estates means settings it has carried since 2012. Do not assume a Server 2025 domain controller gave you any of this.

What's new in Windows Server 2025 →
September 2025 Audit phase

NTLMv1 use is being logged before it is blocked

Since September 2025, attempts to use NTLMv1-derived credentials are logged under Event ID 4024 while authentication continues to work. This applies to the builds where NTLMv1 was removed, meaning Server 2025 and Windows 11 24H2 and later; on older systems NTLMv1 is not removed, not audited by this event, and simply still works. This is the audit window that ran ahead of the October 2026 flip, now listed under Enforcing now. Since 13 October 2026 the event to watch is 4025, which is the block, not the warning. If 4024 was quiet for you during the audit year, 4025 will be too.

Reading the room Pattern

The shape of all of these

Every one of these follows the same arc. An update ships the capability and logs what would break. A later update enforces it, with a rollback. A third update removes the rollback. The audit phase is the entire opportunity, and it is the phase everybody skips. If you take one thing from this page, take the event IDs: 4024 and 4025 for NTLMv1-derived credentials (warned, then blocked), 4022 and 4023 for NTLM sessions negotiated without signing, 3074 and 3075 for LDAP channel binding, 39, 40 and 41 for certificates with no strong mapping, a certificate predating the account, and a SID mismatch respectively, and 201–209 for RC4, of which 205 is the one that flags an explicit configuration that is itself unsafe. Each one is telling you in advance what the next enforcement date is going to cost you.